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DELAWARE'S CORPORATE-LAW SYSTEM: IS
CORPORATE AMERICA BUYING AN EXQUISITE
JEWEL OR A DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH? A
RESPONSE TO KAHAN & KAMAR'S PRICE
DISCRIMINATION iN THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE LAW
Leo E. Strine, Jr.t
In this response to ProfessorsMarcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar's article
titled Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, Vice
ChancellorStrine addresses Professors Kahan and Kamar's contention that
Delaware'ssystem of corporatelaw inefficiently subjects corporationsto excessive uncertainty and litigation costs.
Vice ChancellorStrine makes fourfundamental points. First, he notes
that while Professors Kahan and Kamar criticize Delaware's current approach as indeterminate, they fail to embrace or flesh out a comprehensive
alternative. Second, he points out a contradictionin Kahan and Kamars
argument: under their view, the practicaloperation ofDelaware's corporate
law is both a benefit to and a drain on social wlfare. Third, he suggests
that there are two factors-divided constituent input and human fallibility-that better explain the apparent indeterminay in Delaware corporate
law. Finally, Vice Chancellor Strine questions whether Delaware law is
overly uncertainor inefficient. He concludes that much of the uncertainty of
Delaware'scorporatelaw unavoidablyflows from that law'sflexibility, which
allows economically useful managerialfreedom subject to limitedjudicial intervention to ensure good-faith compliance with fiduciay duties.
INTRODUCTION
When I first read a copy of Price Discriminationin the Market for
CorporateLaw,1 I was worried. Until then I had thought that the states
were exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act and its prohibition on
price discrimination. 2 Were Professors Kahan and Kamar suggesting
- Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery. The author appreciates tie help he
received in writing this piece from his colleague Vice Chancellor Jack B. Jacobs, and his
former law clerks, Marc Bonora, Esq. and Anne Palmer, Esq. This paper was first
presented in its earlier manifestation at the corporate law conference of the University of
Pennsylvania's Center for Law and Economics.
1 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, PdrceDisdminationin the Madae for Corporatelaw 86
ComRNL L. REv. 1205 (2001).
2
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in price between differ-
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that they should not be? But after a re-read, I understood that Delaware was not being accused of illegal monopolistic behavior, only of
monopolistic behavior.
Specifically, the authors have two points. First, they argue that
Delaware rationally prices its product by charging those corporations
who most value and benefit from Delaware incorporation the highest
price, while providing more affordable access to nonpublic corporations.3 The authors further contend that this form of price discrimination is efficient and enhances social welfare because it does not
create a barrier to entry for corporations that would benefit from Delaware incorporation. 4 Second, the authors claim that Delaware also
engages in price discrimination by operating an overly litigation-inten-

sive and indeterminate system of corporate law, which results in Delaware obtaining rents in the form of litigation-generated benefits for its
own economy.5 In their view, this indeterminate system of law subjects
corporate America to excessive uncertainty and litigation costs, and is
6
thus inefficient.
This Response will focus exclusively on the latter contentionthat Delaware's corporation law is excessively uncertain and judgemade and thus inefficient. In particular, I consider, from the perspective of one who has been involved in Delaware's legislative and judicial
process of corporate lawmaking, whether Delaware's self-confessed desire to remain the preeminent forum for the resolution of major corporate disputes causes it to take an unclear approach to corporate law
7
that encourages needless litigation.
In addressing these issues, I will make four major points. First, I
note that implicit in the arguments raised by Professors Kahan and
Kamar is their belief that Delaware law could be improved if it moves
away from its current flexible and enabling paradigm (the "Delaware
Model") toward a more inflexible and statute-based approach (the
"Mandatory Statutory Model"). While Professors Kahan and Kamar
fail to embrace any fully realized alternative to the current Delaware
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.., or
to injure, destroy, or prevent competition .
").
3
See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1223, 1225-28.
4
Id. at 1250.
5 See id. at 1232, 124648.
6
See id. at 1250-51.
7 Immediately before becoming Vice Chancellor, I had the privilege of serving as
Counsel and Policy Director for nearly six years to The Honorable Thomas R. Carper,
Delavare's then-Governor and now United States Senator. In that capacity, I saw firsthand
the executive and legislative branches of Delaware's government attend to issues relevant
to the state's corporation law. As a litigator at a major Delaware corporate law firm before
that, I also observed the diligence of Delaware's bench and bar regarding corporate law
issues. In my admittedly biased view, the collective trusteeship that oversees Delaware's
corporate-law system is highly motivated and committed to its continual improvement.
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Model, they appear to favor changes that would replace director options with statutory requirements." As an initial matter, therefore, I
direct the reader's attention to the fact that both the Delaware Model
and the Mandatory Statutory Model have benefits and costs, and observe that one should be cautious to tear down a house that has served
its residents well in order to construct a new one based on a yet-to-beproduced blueprint.
Second, I point out that Professors Kahan and Kamar seem to
contradict themselves as to the overall effect Delaware's corporation
law has on social welfare. On the one hand, social welfare is increased
because Delaware tax policies permit corporations to gain access to
Delaware's beneficial corporate law and courts. 9 On the other hand,
Delaware takes back some of its corporation law benefits, because the
Delaware Model is too indeterminate and litigation intensive.10 Thus,
according to Professors Kahan and Kamar, the practical operation of
Delaware's corporate law simultaneously constitutes Delaware's contribution to and drain on social welfare.
Third, I suggest that there are at least two other factors-divided
constituent input and human fallibility-that may better explain why
Delaware's law appears indeterminate than the authors' explanation,
which tacitly attributes that indeterminacy to Delauare's conscious or
subconscious desire to extract litigation rents."
Finally, I question whether it is accurate to characterize Delaware's corporate law as too uncertain and inefficient. Instead, I advance the proposition that much of Delaware corporate law's
indeterminacy and litigation intensiveness is an unavoidable consequence of the flexibility of the Delaware Model, which leaves room for
economically useful innovation and creativity. That is, reducing the
indeterminacy of Delaware corporate law by moving closer to the
Mandatory Statutory Model might also impair its central emphasis on
corporate empowerment and private ordering, to the detriment of social welfare.
I
A PREFATORY NoTE ON TE

PARADIGM CHOICE THAT

PROFEssoRs KAHAN AND KAwAR

AvoID MAKING

As I begin, it is critical to note that Professors Kahan and Kamar
have left me with a quite narrow target to shoot at. Although they
contend that Delaware's corporate law is overly indeterminate, the authors do not firmly embrace any concrete alternative, and certainly
8

9
10
11

See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1240-41.
See id. at 1250.
See id. at 1232-40.
See id.at 1245-48.
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not one that is fully fleshed out as a comprehensive law of
corporations.
As I proceed, therefore, I assume (simplistically) that there are
two paradigmatic models for corporation law. 12 One is reflected in
the "Delaware Model," which is largely enabling and provides a wide
realm for private ordering. Though the Delaware Model is premised
on a statute, that statute provides corporate boards with a substantial
amount of leeway to govern their corporations as they see fit. Aside
from the corporate electoral process mandated by the Delaware statute, the ultimate protection provided to investors by Delaware law is
the guarantee that its courts will hold directors responsible for living
up to their fundamental fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
The other paradigmatic approach is also grounded in a statute,
but a statute of a very different sort. The type of corporation statute
required by this alternative "Mandatory Statutory Model" is quite detailed and prescriptive. Because the type of corporate statute required
by that Model would limit choices and require certain procedures, it
would be clearer but also less flexible and nimble. Put somewhat differently, because the statute would dictate how things should happen,
there would be less room for judicial interpretation, but also less
space for director choice.
My sense is that Professors Kahan and Kamar, at bottom, believe
that the Delaware Model is, on balance, the better one. Yet they are
disturbed by Delaware's failure to live up to its full potential and frustrated by Delaware's failure to adopt clarifying measures that they believe are unquestionably advisable.
Because Professors Kahan and Kamar fail to articulate a comprehensive vision of the ideal corporate-law system, they render their argument more difficult to refute, but at the same time, less persuasive.
I do not quibble with the proposition that Delaware law can be improved in important but marginal ways. To the extent that Professors
Kahan and Kamar only contend that Delaware law suffers from the
fact that no human-created system is pristine, I am happy to agree
with them.
But because Professors Kahan and Kamar imply that Delaware is a
long way from optimality, I fairly infer that they support some aggressive changes to Delaware corporation law-changes that lean toward
the Mandatory Statutory Model. This inference is supported by the
changes Professors Kahan and Kamar tentatively suggest should be
12 I fully acknowledge that one can shape a system of corporate law that reflects elements of both approaches, and that Delaware law itself embodies elements of each. Even
so, I believe that keeping the two basic models in mind is useful in analyzing the arguments
made by Professors Kahan and Kamar.
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adopted by Delaware, most of which involve the substitution of a supple regime for governing transactions with more rigid statutory rules.
Permeating my dubious reaction to the authors' thesis that a
move towards the Mandatory Statutory Model would improve social
welfare is a sensitivity to the relationship between increased certainty

and decreased flexibility. The Delaware Model and the Mandatory
Statutory Model each have their own benefits and their own costs.
Professors Kahan and Kamar appear to believe that a variety of easily
adopted changes could turn Delaware law into the optimal blend of
these two paradigmatic choices, and that Delaware's failure to take
these easy steps results from its self-interest in excessive uncertainty.
While the grounds for my demurral follow in more detail, suffusing
my analysis is the natural skepticism that arises because the authors
chip away at the edifice of Delaware law without advancing a new
blueprint of their own and carefully explaining its drawbacks.
II
DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW: Do PROFESSORS KAHAN AND KAINtAR
Posrr THAT MAJOR A RIGmwcAN CORPORATIONS CAN'T Lns wiTH IT,
CAN'T LWVE WrrHour IT?
The reasoning of Professors Kahan and Karnar has a central contradiction that serves to reinforce some of my concerns about their
conclusion that Delaware's corporation law price discriminates in a
manner injurious to social welfare. Professors Kahan and Kamar argue that Delaware's corporate franchise tax price discriminates in an
economically efficient manner.1 3 Because Delaware prices its
franchise tax to impose the highest costs on those corporations most
likely to derive genuine benefits from Delaware incorporation, corporations can domicile in Delaware under a tax-pricing structure that
tailors costs roughly to the benefit each corporation will derive from
domiciling in Delaware. 14 What this means, in essence, is that the cor-

porations that pay the highest franchise taxes are large, publicly
traded firms'15

On the other hand, Professors Kahan and Kamar also conclude
that Delaware's corporation law price discriminates in a manner that
likely has a negative effect on social welfare. By virtue of its indeterminate quality, the Delaware Model results in a greater amount of transactional uncertainty and litigation than is optimal. 16 Because large,
13

14
15

16

Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1250-52.
See id. at 1225-29.
Id at 1225-28.
See id. at 1252.
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publicly traded firms are much more likely to be subjected to litiga17
tion, the costs of this indeterminacy fall primarily on them.
The contradiction inherent in these two arguments emerges from
the fact that Professors Kahan and Kamar essentially admit that the

benefits that large, publicly traded corporations derive from Delaware
incorporation are intertwined with the costs that those firms allegedly
suffer by reason of the indeterminacy of Delaware corporate law.' 8
The benefits that Professors Kahan and Kamar claim motivate large,
publicly traded corporations to pay sizeable franchise taxes are all related to Delaware's supposedly excessively uncertain corporation law.
Thus, they say that large, publicly traded corporations are willing to
pay more for the following benefits of Delaware incorporation: (1) the
ability to have lawsuits resolved by Delaware's expert judiciary;' 9 (2)
access to Delaware's highly developed case law and the ease of obtaining legal advice about that law; 20 (3) the value that investors, traders, and other market participants place on an enterprise's status as a
Delaware corporation operating under a familiar and trusted corporation law;2 ' and (4) Delaware's commitment to updating its corporadon law to ensure that it meets the needs of its constituents. 22 Indeed,
Professors Kahan and Kamar acknowledge that large corporations frequently redomicile into Delaware in advance of undertaking major
acquisitions. 23 That is, these large corporations seek out Delaware's
indeterminate and litigation-intensive corporation law at exactly the
time in their corporate existences when the potential for litigation is
at its zenith.
Paradoxically, these same large, publicly traded corporations also
suffer the greatest costs from the fact that Delaware's system of corporation law, while superior to anyone else's, is not perfect. These corporations endure the maddening experience of buying into Delaware
to obtain the benefits of its corporation law, only to face costs resulting from the indeterminate and litigation-intensive nature of that
same law. Indeed, Professors Kahan and Kamar contend that if the
burdens of that indeterminacy and litigation intensiveness did not fall
primarily on those large public firms that derive the most value from
those aspects of Delaware corporation law that (one supposes) do not
suffer from these defects, Delaware would have a stronger incentive to
24
improve its corporation law.
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

See id. at 1242-45.
See id. at 1245.
Id. at 1212.
Id.

Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1228 n.1O1.
Id. at 1245-46.

20011

DELAWARE'S CORPORATE-LAW SYSTEM12

1263

The overall conclusion of Professors Kahan and Kamar can be
distilled as follows: the Delaware corporate-law system is so superior to
any of its current alternatives that large, publicly traded corporations
will suffer its marginal defects without much protest. In other words,
Professors Kahan and Kamar embrace a "can't live with it, can't live
without it" view of Delaware corporate law. Their conclusion that Delaware's franchise tax price discriminates in a socially useful manner is
premised on the fact that Delaware's franchise tax is designed not to
discourage corporations that benefit from incorporating in Delaware
from doing so.25 To say it pithily, Delaware's taxing practices price
discriminate in a socially useful way because those practices do not
26
obstruct access to our corporation law and our courts.
Recognizing that Delaware corporate law is not optimal, Professors Kahan and Kamar argue that some of the social gains produced
by Delaware's franchise tax pricing policies are taken back by the costs
imposed on corporations and shareholders by Delaware's litigationintensive and overly indeterminate corporate law.2 7 Although quite
cautious about the extent of this drain on economic efficieny,'- they
seem convinced that Delaware's system of corporate law could be
markedly improved by replacing the current flexible, standards-based
Delaware Model with their clearer and more rigid Mandatory Statu29
tory Model.

But, as I proceed, I suggest to the reader that a deeper consideration of the data Professors Kahan and Kamar rely upon points to another possibility. That possibility is that large, publicly traded
corporations rationally choose Delaware law because its preference
for flexibility rather than rigidity allows corporate boards to structure
corporate transactions in a manner best tailored to the particular circumstances their corporations face. While the DelaN-are Model might
subject firms to litigation, these firms readily accept that risk as a cost
of greater flexibility, especially because they know that the litigation
they face will have the following two characteristics: (1) it will likely be
administered by a Delaware judiciary well schooled in corporate law
and with a track record of producing rational results, and (2) it will be
governed by a body of statutory and decisional corporation law which
articulates many norms that, if followed at the time of the transaction
being litigated, can limit the possibility of an adverse judgment.
These public corporations may well recognize that litigable uncertain25

See id.at 1252-53.

26

See id

27
28

See ieL at 1250-52.
See id. at 1234-36.

29

See id.
at 124041.
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ties are difficult to eradicate totally from a corporation law system
whose flexibility provides great freedom for private ordering.
Indeed, it is not at all clear that the nirvana which Professors
Kahan and Kamar aspire to-a corporation-law system that has all the
virtues of the Delaware Model with none of its costs-can exist. Any
serious effort to eradicate the marginal uncertainty of Delaware corporate law by moving closer to the Mandatory Statutory Model may
well diminish social welfare by stifling innovation and reducing transactional flexibility.
III
Do OTHER FAcToRs BETTER EXPLAIN THE ALLEGED
INDETERMINACY OF DELAWARE

LAW?

Professors Kahan and Kamar proceed with commendable discretion in addressing why they view Delaware law as overly indeterminate.
They do not boldly suggest that Delaware corporate-law elites consciously shape" a corporation law that yields a constant stream of corporate litigation in the Delaware courts, thereby promoting legal
employment, filling hotel rooms, and (modestly) raising tax revenues. 3 1 Instead, their argument focuses on effect, not cause. That is,
they gently point out that the economic benefits Delaware derives
from a healthy flow of corporate litigation, combined with the need
for interpretive opinions of our corporation law, limit Delaware's "incentives" to reduce the indeterminacy of its law.3 2 Remarkably,
Professors Kahan and Kamar even suggest that Delaware has a motive
to muddy up its corporate law because this murkiness makes it diffi3s
cult for other states to copy it.
30 Id. at 1232.
31 See id. at 1245-47 (detailing the benefits of corporate litigation for Delaware).
32 Id. at 1245-48.
33 Id. at 1247 n.170. Although it is beyond the scope of this response, I pause to note
that this particular argument is somewhat unusual. By making its law a muddle, Kahan and
Kamar say, Delaware makes it difficult for other states to copy it. Id. But if the underlying
value in Delaware law is not its murky case law but something else that Kahan and Hamar
do not define, one would think that other states have an opportunity to trumpet legal
structures (if such structures exist) that provide greater clarity than Delaware and that limit
the opportunity and need for litigation. Is our corporation law a wine that cannot be
decanted of its impurities? Isn't it the case that new products are often marketed as having
all the virtues of an existing product, but without the bugs?
A very recent example of marketing efforts along these lines states:
Many practitioners choose Delaware on instinct, based on nonquantifiable
concepts such as the existence of a wider body of case law interpreting corporation law and a judiciary that is perceived to be more sophisticated in
corporation law matters. Others choose Delaware due to inertia, based on
prior experience in Delaware or investment banker advice that everybody
does it.
The Texas Legislature over the past fifteen years has sought to address
the Delaware bias by improving the corporation laws of the State and estab-
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In advancing these arguments, Professors Kahan and Kamar
again emphasize the "bitter with the sweet" quality of the choice to
incorporate in Delaware. Because large public corporations on the
whole derive extensive benefits from Delaware, they are unlikely to
flee. 4 Yet, because those corporations are most likely to suffer from
the indeterminacy of Delaware law, the imperfections of that law fall
principally on them.3 5 For that reason, Professors Kahan and Kamar
contend, Delaware is not subjected to as much pressure to improve its
law as might be the case if its law's costs did not fall on the primary
36
beneficiaries.
Although they may be too polite to say it bluntly, Professors
Kahan and Kamar basically assert that Delaware is a bit of a fat and

happy monopolist. Confident in its preeminence, Delaware is content
to reap the extra benefits thrown off by the litigation generated by the
unclear aspects of its corporation law, knowing that its most important
customers have nowhere better to go.

This Delawarean does not find this argument convincing, for reasons that I will now explain. I begin by conceding at the outset that in
many ways Delaware corporation law is less than optimally clear.3 7 I
lishing clear statutory answers to questions that have historically been addressed in Delaware by case law. Although Delaware has attempted to
follow suit in certain areas by providing corporations with greater flexibility
in structuring business combinations and establishing their capital structures, many areas continue to be left to the Delaware courts. The Delaware
courts have in turn tended to establish legal principles that often create
more questions than they resolve. Often this leaves counsel unable to give
clear advice as to how transactions may be structured and allows Delaware
judges to second guess the business judgment of Texas-based corporations.
Accordingly, it is now time for practitioners to shed their historical notions
of Delaware as the most desirable jurisdiction for incorporation and to seriously consider the differences between Texans and Delaware law on corporation law issues. The results of such an inquiry may be surprising.
Byron F. Egan & Curtis W. Huff,Chwie of State of Incorporation-Texas ersus Delaware:Is It
Now Time to Rethink TraditionalNotions., 54 SMU L Rxv. 249, 250 (2001).
34 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1245.
35
See id.at 1242.
36 Id. at 1246.
37 Recently, I have dealt with numerous examples of Delaware corporate law's suboptimal clarity. One such area involves the question of when appraisal is a plaintiff's exclusive
remedy after Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chmnical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985). See, e.g.,
Nagyv. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43,50-56 (Del. Ch. 2000); Turner v Bernstein, 768 A.2d 24, 2627 (Del. Ch. 2000); Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 191-96 (Del. Ch. 2000). Another such
area involves the sometimes elusive distinction betveen derivative and individual claims.
See; eg., Golaine v. Edwards, No. 15404, 1999 Del. Ch.LEXIS 237, at O10-26 (Del. Ch. Dec.
21, 1999); In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 747 A.2d 71, 75-83 (Del. Ch.
1999). Yet another difficult spot involves when to apply the compellingiustification standard of Blasiuslndustries,In.v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988). S,, e.g., Chesapeake
Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 317-24 (Del. Ch. 2000). Finally, there is the problematic
relationship between the Unocal standard of review, see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985), and the business judgment and entire faimess stan-

1266

CORNELL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 86:1257

admit also that there are aspects of Delaware law that the judiciary
itself has the unquestioned authority to clarify.
One area Professors Kahan and Kamar properly cite by way of
example is shareholder ratification. 38 In several opinions, the Court
of Chancery has urged the Supreme Court to provide more certain
guidance about the effect to be given a fully informed majority vote of
disinterested stockholders. 39 In less-than-subtle ways, the Court of
Chancery has implied that Delaware's current case law provides little
or no incentive for a corporation to condition a transaction on the
approval of a majority of the disinterested minority. 40 Such approval
(at least in the case of a squeeze-out merger) has no greater likelihood
of reducing the risk of director liability than would the formation of a
special committee of independent directors to negotiate the
41
transaction.
It makes sense, at least to me, that the business judgment rule
should protect a transaction expressly conditioned on approval of the
disinterested minority stockholders and based on adequate disclosures. But does everyone agree? My sense is that the answer is no.
For example, Robert Clark advances the following view of the efficacy
of stockholder votes in ensuring the integrity of self-interested
transactions:
To summarize about the shareholder approval procedure as a way
of policing basic self-dealing transactions: It would be perverse for
the legal system to have many such matters taken to the shareholders; folly to expect the shareholders to pass upon them in a careful,
well informed way; and wrong to hold them to the consequences of
42
their failing to do so.
Some commentators have also criticized as indeterminate Delaware law's approach to defenses against hostile takeovers. 4 3 Can one
dards of review. See, e.g., In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Lifg., 753 A.2d 462, 47377 (Del. Ch. 2000).
38 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1237 n.133.
39
See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902 & n.88 (Del. Ch. 1999);
Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1113-14 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del.
2000) (unpublished table decision); In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 663
A.2d 1194, 1204-05 (Del. Ch. 1995).
40
See Huizenga, 751 A.2d at 900-01.
41
See id. at 900-01, 901 n.81 (noting cases which hold that neither device removes the
entire fairness standard's application to a squeeze-out merger, but merely shifts the burden
of proof to the plaintiff).
42
ROBERT CHARLES CLARIu, CORUORATE LAW § 5.4, at 182 (1986).
43 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk &Allen Ferrell, Federalism and CorporateLaw: The Race
to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1168, 1191 (1999); Joseph A.
Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealingwith BarbariansInside the Gates, 45
STAN. L. REV. 857, 859 n.4 (1993); Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pillsand Litigation Uncertaintt,
1989 Duoe L.J. 54, 71-81.
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really reconcile ParamountCommunications,Inc. v. Time Ine.4 4 and Paramount CommunicationsInc. v. QVC Network Inc.?45 Is it sensible to view a
stock-for-stock merger as having a less significant influence on stockholder economic rights than an outright sale? Is a target board legally
entitled to "just say no" and keep a poison pill in place regardless of
the circumstances?
I will not play pretend and advance the proposition that Delaware's takeover law is perfectly clear. On the other hand, I am also
unaware of any alternative approach that would generate a consensus
among American corporate-law practitioners and commentators.
For example, the law would have been far more clear had Delaware courts simply prohibited boards of directors from using rights
plans or other defenses to interfere with a tender offer to buy the
company. That clarity would, however, have denied corporate boards
the ability to protect their stockholders from structurally coercive
47
tender offers 46 and to negotiate for better offers.

But having authorized boards to use extraordinary defensive devices such as poison pills, Delaware courts could hardly sit back and let
directors employ those options without scrutiny. The potential for
abuse would have been intolerable, and the value-enhancing benefits
of properly used defenses would have been outweighed by the risks
created by giving directors free rein to reject genuinely worthy offers.
Policing potential director abuse in this area raised many questions. When and for how long could directors keep poison pills and
other defensive measures in place? 48 Were some defensive measures
too extreme?49 To what extent did the fact that stockholders could or
could not vote out the board enter into the court's evaluation of defensive measures? 50 Was a board required to forsake a long-term strat44
45
46

571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
See, eg., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-59 (Del. 1985).
47 See Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Negotiation Afodd of Tender Offer Defenses and tMe Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CoNxEu. L REv. 117, 120-21 (1986).
48
See, eg., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del.
1995) (applying Delaware law and upholding target board's refusal to redeem poison pill
in the face of increasingly valuable all-cash offers by hostile bidder); City Capital Assocs. v.
Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (granting affirmative relief requiring board of
directors to redeem poison pill because mild threat from noncoercive cash offer did not
justify effectively foreclosing shareholders from accepting offer), called into doubt i Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
49 See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998)
(invalidating a slow-hand poison pill on grounds that it impermissibly "depriveld] any
newly elected board of both its statutory authority to manage the corporation ... and its
concomitant fiduciary duty pursuant to that statutory mandate").
50 See, eg., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (reversing
Chancery Court's grant of preliminary injunction and remanding for determination of
whether repurchase program, as an addition to a poison pill previously in place, uas a
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egy simply because an unsolicited bidder presented an immediate
51
premium-generating offer?
Fortunately for me, to raise-rather than answer-these quesdons is enough to make my point. That is, I think it is worth exploring whether Delaware law is indeterminate and thus litigation
intensive in areas where there is no consensus among its constituency.
Consider, for example, the questions just raised. Who would venture
to say, with confidence, that there is a sufficient consensus among the
various constituents to whom Delaware is responsive to develop precise legislation addressing exactly what, when, and how defensive measures can be used?
During the 1980s, Delaware did pass a so-called antitakeover statute. 52 That effort, however, was modest. It merely constrained the

ability of a hostile bidder to acquire a substantial voting block and
thereafter exert pressure to acquire the rest of the company.53 There
was no political consensus that a more aggressive antitakeover statute
was advisable.
This perspective suggests that the indeterminacy of Delaware's
corporation law may not result from Delaware's subconscious desire
to extract more lucrative litigation "rents." Instead, it results from
Delaware's acknowledged responsiveness to its corporate constituency
and the corresponding reality that its law will tend to reflect any lack
of accord within that constituency. My own firsthand observation of
the policy elites central to Delaware corporate lawmaking-most importantly, the members of the Delaware State Bar Association's Corporate Law Council-is that they are acutely sensitive to constituency
input. These decision makers can and do persuade the Governor and
the General Assembly to amend the corporate law rapidly when there
is a demonstrable consensus in the corporate community that such
changes are advisable.
But-and the "but" is important-this process breaks down when
Delaware's corporate constituency is divided on the subject matter at
hand. It is, by now, commonplace to say that Delaware responds reflexively to corporate managers, 4 but such trite statements are, in my
"draconian" defense measure based on viability of proxy fight after completion of repurchase program).
51 See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
52

66 Del. Laws ch. 204, § 1 (1988) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 203 (2000)).
53 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2000). The statute does so by, among other
things, preventing a hostile bidder from buying more than 14.9% of the voting stock of a
company if it wishes to acquire that company in the ensuing three years. Id. § 203(a),

(c) (5).
54 See William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Rejlecions upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 670 (1974) (arguing that Delaware "courts have undertaken to . . . create a
'favorable climate' for management").
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view, naive and do not tell the whole story. That tired notion ignores
the belief of most Delaware corporate law decision makers that Delaware's primacy depends on balance.5 5 If Delauare law does not continue to afford sufficient protection for the actual providers of
capital-the investors-it will eventually lose its dominance.
To illustrate this point, lawyers from several states are presently
marketing the fact that their state corporation laws allow "bulletproof"
antitakeover defensive measures, whereas Delaware's does not.5G Why
has Delaware not responded in kind? Putting aside the normative
thought that it might be inadvisable to allow managers virtually unchecked power to keep owners from selling their stock, I would suggest that Delaware has not responded because self-interested

Delawareans believe that a more balanced approach is essential to
maintain their competitive advantage. Delaware's corporate bar is not
unmindful that investors in initial public offerings (IPOs) would be
7
disinclined to invest in entities that cannot be sold down the line.
The fact that Delaware law limits a corporate board's ability to insulate
itself completely from a change in control is attractive to those investors and provides corporations seeking capital an incentive to domi58
cile in Delaware.
Professors Kahan and Kamar correctly imply that Delaware law
wil likely be inefficiently indeterminate only at the margin.59 Even
they point out that Delaware has much to lose by creating a corporate
law so indeterminate and litigation intensive as to drive out its corpo55 Cf E. Norman Veasey, An Economic RationaleforJudidalDedsionmalngin CoipOrate
Law, 53 Bus. LAkw. 681, 694-95 (1998) (emphasizing that Delmare's traditional approach is
a balanced one).
56 See, eg., BartJ. Colli & Debra S. Groisser, A Reason to Incoraoratein NXwJerrty, 159
NJ. LJ. 608, 612 (2000) ("NewJersey may offer significant advantages [over Delaware] to
corporations seeking anti-takeover protection. .. ").
57
Delaware appears to be the state of choice for firms going "public." Sre, e.g., John

C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Failure in the Corporate Law
Market 31, 43 (June 26, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file ith author); RoBrER
DAInFs, DoEs DELAWARE LkW hiPROvE FRa.%t VALUE? 48 thl.4 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus.,
Working Paper No. CLB-99-011, 1999; and Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Studies in Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 159, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=195109 (last visitedJuly 26, 2001). In suggesting that investors are comfortable with the balance Delaware law affords, I do not mean to assert that most of the
companies that go public in Delaware do so with no defenses in their certificates. See
Coates, supra, at 44, 47 (noting that only forty-three percent of studied firms who went
public in Delaware had defensive measures that made it more difficult to acquire a firm
than if the default provisions of Delaware law applied, but that companies incorporated in

Delaware had more defensive measures than the average of the whole sample). Rather, I
simply note that Delaware has a more investor-friendly approach to takeovers than many
states that authorize insurmountable defenses.
58 There is some empirical evidence that suggests that Delauare's balanced approach
is reflected in higher market valuations for Delaare fins than comparable firms incorporated elsewhere. See DAINFs, supra note 57, at 4.
59
See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1282.
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rate constituency. 60 Smith v. Van Gorkom6 ' is a prime example. It did
not take Delaware long to figure out that it would pay dearly if it insisted on subjecting directors who made good-faith, but negligent,
business decisions to damages liability. 62 To avoid that, Delaware
quickly came up with a mechanism-title 8, section 102(b) (7) of the
Delaware Code-to all but eradicate the effect of Van Gorhom. 63 Indeed, but for the adoption of section 102(b) (7), my sense is that the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Cede & Co. v.Technicolor, Inc.61
("Cede IT)-that directors who breach their duty of care must prove
that they did not cause damage 65-would also have been dealt with
through legislative action. In areas where a consensus emerges that

there is a need for greater clarity or certainty, Delaware's Corporate
Law Council will generally draft and obtain swift passage of legislative
amendments.

66

When there is no consensus, however, they will not.

Our courts are also responsive to "constituent pressures," which

often take the form of learned commentary on our corporation law.
Thejudiciary's articulation and subsequent abandonment of the "busId. at 1235.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
62 See id.at 877-78, 880, 893 (holding board of directors liable for approval of cash-out
merger when, inter alia, board members failed to inform themselves as to the value of tie
corporation and accepted a price based on calculations designed solely to determine tie
feasibility of a leveraged buy-out, even though the board received a highly favorable price
and negotiated for the ability to seek out superior bids).
63 DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (2000) (allowing corporations to waive director
liability for monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care). The enactment of section
102(b) (7) is but one example that contradicts the assertion of Kahan and Kamar that the
Delaware Corporate Law Council "will be inclined not to endorse proposals to make Delaware law less litigation-intensive even if doing so would benefit Delaware corporations."
Kahan & Kamar, supranote 1, at 1232 n.1 17. For two more recent examples, see infra note
66.
64 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
65 Id. at 370-71. Cede II has this effect by requiring a negligent director to show that
the outcome resulting from his negligent behavior was "entirely fair" to the plaintiffs. Id.
66 For example, this year the Corporate Law Council proposed and secured adoption
of an amendment to title
8, section 122 of the Delaware Code to give corporate boards
more flexibility to define business opportunities that are not within the scope of the corporation's strategic plan. 72 Del. Laws ch. 343, § 3 (2000) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 122(17) (2001)) (giving each Delaware corporation the power to "[rienounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors, any interest or expectancy of
the corporation in ...specified business opportunities... that are presented to the corporation or one or more of its officers, directors, or stockholders"). This amendment will
enable corporations to better avoid corporate-opportunity claims against their directors
and officers, as exposure to such claims has been a concern among directors of firms in the
high-technology sector. Cf Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
CorporateLaw, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 1908, 1916 (1998) (identifying the corporate-opportunity
doctrine as an example of indeterminacy in Delaware law).
Another example is the relatively recent amendment to title 8, section 251(c) of the
Delaware Code enabling a board of directors to bind itself to put a transaction to a shareholder vote even if it changes its mind about the advisability of that transaction before the
vote. 72 Del. Laws ch. 123, § 6 (1999) (codified at DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(g) (2000)).
60
61
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iness purpose" requirement in parent-subsidiary mergers provides a
good example. 67 Some of the disclosure decisions after In re Tr-Star
Pictures,Inc., Litigation68 may also be read this way, 69 as may Paramount
70
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.
The reality is that Delaware courts and corporate practitioners
receive a steady stream of feedback in many forms nationwide. Some
of this feedback involves implicit threats from corporate practitioners
that corporations will redomicile elsewhere unless Delaware makes improvements. 7 1 Delaware corporate law decision makers do not
blithely ignore such commentary; to the contrary, they take it very seriously. Indeed, in my view, Delawkareans perceive their state's ability
to extract rents through excessive litigation as extremely limited.

Thus, Professors Kahan and Kamar should hesitate before ascribing
Delaware law's indeterminacy to subconscious rent-seeking motives.
The foregoing analysis should encourage corporate-law scholars
to test whether the indeterminacy in Delaware corporate law occurs in
areas where there is no consensus among learned corporate commentators and other relevant constituencies.7 2 If that hypothesis is correct, it is predictable that in those circumstances, Delaware will
muddle through on a case-by-case basis, using judicial review as a safeguard against abuse, but with the mindset of validating well-motivated
director action. The Delaware Model, while perhaps not optimal,
does allow for a more unfettered evolution of corporate practice than
would the hasty adoption of legislative standards about which substantial disagreement persists. Uncertainty has its costs, but so does ill-

67
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), overruledby Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
68 634 A.2d 319, 333-34 (Del. 1993) (holding that proof of damages -asnot required
in a case involving breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure).
69
See, eg., Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 142 (Del. 1997) (limiting Tri-Starto only require courts to award "nominal damages" absent proof of damages
flowing from breach of duty of disclosure).
70
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); see id. at 1150-51 (refusing to apply tie enhanced-scrutiny analysis of Revlon, Ina v. MacAlndrews &Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986),
to a case in which a target board's actions "might be viewed as effectively putting [the target] up for sale"); see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Des Delaware Corporate
Law Work, 44 UCLA L RE,. 1009, 1072-75 (1997) (construing Time as a alidation of the
just say no" defense, and a response to criticisms of an earlier case).
71
See Laurie P. Cohen, Lipton Tells Clientsthat DelawareMay Not Be a Place to Incorporate,

WALL ST.J.,

Nov. 11, 1988, at B7.

Cf William T. Allen, Ambigui, in Corporation Law,22 Dr.t J. Coin. L 894, 899
(1997) ("[M]ore often than not, the most interesting conflicts in corporation law are engendered not by 'bad guys' seeking with guile to protect or advance private interests. The
difficult and interesting questions arise from differing, but plausible, conceptions of what
constitutes right action in the circumstances.").
72
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advised certainty, especially when that certainty comes about through
73
a universally applicable legislative edict.
I also briefly note, in this regard, that Professors Kahan and
Kamar give short shrift to another powerful explanatory factor: Delaware corporate law is written by humans who are fallible and torn by
conflicting values that can lead to somewhat inconsistent public policies. Human-run institutions sometimes engage in tacit rivalries with
other institutions in areas of shared responsibility, rivalries that some-

times generate paradoxical 74 or confusing 75 results.

These

noneconomic factors must also be taken into account before one can
confidently attribute the indeterminacy of Delaware law to the state's
economic motivations.
IV
Is

DELAWARE'S APPROACH TO CORPORATE LAw INEFFICIENT?

I turn now to the larger claim that Delaware corporate law is
suboptimal and that there is a better way. I start by posing a rhetorical
question: Do Delaware's constituents want Delaware corporate law to
be optimally nonlitigious? As Kahan and Kamar point out:
The costs of a litigation-intensive system fall primarily on Delaware
corporations that participate in the kind of activities that tend to
give rise to legal disputes. To the extent that these companies are
involved in litigation, they directly bear the costs of a more litigation-intensive corporate law....

Companies that are involved in litigation or undertake transactions that may result in litigation are the ones assigning the highest
value to incorporating in Delaware. These companies gain most
from the fact that Delaware law, though litigation intensive, offers a
73

In another article, Professor Kamar has noted as an example of ourjudiciary's re-

luctance to formulate bright-line rules the Supreme Court's frequently quoted statement
in Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989), that "there is no single
blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its [Revlon] duties," id. at 1286. Kamar, supra
note 66, at 1915 & n.18. Would it have been more efficient for the Delaware General
Assembly or the Delaware Supreme Court to have written such a blueprint rather than
accord substantial deference to corporate boards who seek the highest value through
means they find appropriate for their situation and industry sector? The question has, at
the very least, an uncertain answer.
74 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 358, 361, 369-71 (Del, 1993)
("Cede II"). In that case involving the duty of care, the Delaware Supreme Court turned
Chancellor Allen's assumptionforpurposes of analysis that the defendant board had violated
the duty of care, see Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS
105, at *55-*57 (Del. Ch.June 21, 1991), affd inpartand rev'd inpartsub nom. Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), into a finding offact to that effect, Cede II, 634
A.2d at 358-59. Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a breach of the duty
of care requires directors to prove that they did not cause damage, see id. at 371, despite the
fact that Delaware had adopted a gross-negligence standard to ensure that directors were
not inhibited by liability risk.
75 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (affirming the Chancellor, but on a different ground).
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higher qualityjudiciary, a better developed case law, and more readily available legal advice than any other state law. 76
Kahan and Kamar add the following in a footnote:
In a litigation-oriented system (as opposed to a system based on regulation or private ordering), involvement in litigation reflects firms'
use of the law. The level of litigation is determined by the extent to
which the law generally fosters litigation and by the propensity of
individual firms to be involved in lawsuits. If Delaware law w-s less
litigation intensive, but still litigation oriented, the same firms
would demonstrate a higher incidence of involvement in lawsuits
than others as today, but the general level of litigation would be
lower.

77

Do these large public firms believe Delaware corporate law is too uncertain? There is reason to think not.
Consider the area of disclosure. In virtually every transaction involving stockholder approval, shareholder plaintiffs may bring claims
asserting that proxy disclosures are legally deficient. In 1998, corporate America persuaded Congress to restrict the ability of shareholder
plaintiffs to bring disclosure class actions in the federal courts and to
preempt most state regulation of corporate disclosures in such lawsuits. 78 That legislation has an exemption known as the "Delawrare
carve-out," which preserves the ability of stockholders to bring a suit
alleging that directors have breached their fiduciary duties by providing inadequate disclosures to stockholders in connection with a stockholder vote. 7 9 The Delaware carve-out was passed with the support of
corporate America, even though a so-called "duty of disclosure" claim
under Delaware law does not require the plaintiff to make any showing of reliance.8 0
Why would corporate America and the then-Speaker of the
House, Newt Gingrich, have allowed this carve-out? One (albeit immodest) suggestion is that corporate America would prefer to defend
disclosure claims in the Delaware courts rather than in the federal
courts. One reason for this preference might be that Delaware courts
will often resolve disclosure claims before a stockholder vote, thereby
enabling the defendants to cure any disclosure problem promptly.
Another might be that Delaware courts have developed a level of experience with such claims that affords greater predictability. Still anKahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1242-43 (footnotes omitted).
77 M at 1243 n.155.
78 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227.
79
15 U.S.C § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (Supp. IV 1998).
80 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998).
76
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other might be that a lawsuit in Delaware can efficiently address most,
if not all, of the claims arising out of a transaction. 81
This service might be seen as efficient if it were not for the possibility that a Mandatory Statutory Model of corporate law might obviate
the need for most of this litigation in the first place.8 2 Therefore, one
area for further inquiry is whether such an approach is really feasible
given our political culture. That is, is the choice confronted by corporate America (and stockholders) whether to litigate or under what law to
litigate?
To the extent that it is somewhat indeterminate and dependent
on ex post judicial judgments, Delaware corporate law is not unique.
83
Is not the same true of American tort and products liability law? Antitrust law?8 4 Federal case law under the Due Process Clause?8 5 How
about the HMO debate in the 2000 presidential campaign in which
now-President George W. Bush, of all people, took credit for legislation creating a right to sue? 86 Is there any reason to believe that other
states or the federal government could competently implement a corporate law less dependent on judicial decision making? 87 Put simply,
Delaware corporation law is only one part of a larger American politi81 A cynic, of course, might claim that this preference is because Delaware is prodefendant and enables corporate defendants to obtain a broad release of liability for all
federal and state liability in exchange for modest costs largely involving the payment of
attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' lawyers. I am not so cynical, but I do believe that Delaware
courts provide a forum where corporations can resolve claims predictably and promptly.
82 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1240-41. In this regard, one can also ask
whether the experience under the federal securities laws would tend to prove or disprove
the proposition that a detailed statutory and regulatory scheme will reduce litigation (including administrative adjudicative practice).
83 Cf James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of American
ProductsLiability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332, 1342 (1991) (predicting that future products
liability law will have a "sharper focus").
84 See Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. Rxv. 1677, 1682-83
(1995).
85 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some ConfusionsAbout Due Process,JudicialReview, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. Rxv. 309, 309 (1993).
86 See Richard S. Dunham, Bush the Reformer? hy He's Not Just Blowing Smoke, Bvs,
W., Mar. 13, 2000, at 49, 2000 WL 7825138.
87 The assertion that Delaware courts are more likely than other American courts to
emphasize that their holdings are limited to the case at hand, see Kahan & Kamar, supra
note 1, at 1239, is questionable. Statements to that effect can be found all over American
caselaw, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances...."), and reflect thejudiciary's special role in our republican form
of democracy.
Indeed, limited holdings have long been considered an integral part of common-law
decision making. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Lauw
(1870), reprinted in The Early W-itings of 0. TV Holmes,Jr., 44 HARv. L. REv. 725, 725 (1931)
("It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.... [L]awyers... frequently see well enough how they ought to decide on a
given state of facts without being very clear as to the ratio decidendi."); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1974) (discussing
the role of the United States Supreme Court). Professor Amsterdam writes:
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cal culture that has traditionally relied upon litigation as a way to
check abuses of authority and to provide recompense to those injured
by otherwise lawful activity that is carelessly or recklessly conducted.
Those who criticize Delaware corporate law as inefficient must confront the difficult challenge of articulating a better system. The Delaware Model, as Professors Kahan and Kamar note, provides corporate
managers with the flexibility to do practically any lawful act, subject to
judicial review focused on whether the managers were properly motivated and not irrational. 8a
It is far from obvious that adoption of something more akin to
the Mandatory Statutory Model would be more efficient. That approach would involve more mandated processes and thus costs of its
own, resulting in questionable efficiency effects. By subjecting managers to clearer, but more rigid, rules, the Mandatory Statutory Model
might also stifle innovation. Complex human behavior rarely lends
itself to bright-line rules. Even stop lights have a grey area-the grey
area just happens to be yellow.
Professors Kahan and Kamar confidently point to bright-line
rules that they claim "could provide more predictability than... the
present system" without compromising flexibility,8 9 but they do not
[Tihe welter of life is constantly churning up situations in iwhich the application of dear and consistent theories would produce unacceptable results.
The results are unacceptable not because of mere personal or emotional
aversion to them, but because the case has stirred some profound countervailing principle.... [The principle] speaks imperatively to the case and
wrests it from the grip of all the theory that has been before.
... Clarity and consistency are desirable, certainly, to the extent that
they can be achieved. But the temptation to achieve them by ignoring the
complex and the unpredictable quality of real problems is fortunately less
beguiling to Justices perennially faced with responsibility for solving those
problems than to theJustices' academic critics.
Id.; see also Thurnan Arnold, ProfessorHart's Theolog, 73 HRv. L RE%. 1298, 1312 (1960)
(claiming that formerJustice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court repeatedly
asserted that "courts should avoid deciding any question not directly and unavoidably in

issue").
Flexibility, as opposed to rigid rules, also plays a central role in due process jurisprudence. See, ag., Kentucky v. 'Whorton,441 U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979) (per curiam) (holding
that the Kentucky Supreme Court's inquiry "should have been directed to . . whether the
failure to give ... instruction[s] in the present case deprived the respondent of due process
of law in light of the totality of the circumstances," and not whether due process requires such
instruction in every case (emphases added)); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610
(1974) ("'The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.'" (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961))).
As importantly, Professors Kahan and Kamar ignore other commentators who have
stressed the important and useful role that the Delaware courts have pla)ed in giving guidance to corporations through dictum. See, eg., RonaldJ. Gilson, The Fine Art ofJudging:
William T. Allen, 22 DE-J. Coax. L. 914, 916 (1997) (referring to Chancellor Allen's practice of "delivering lectures on how transactions should be conducted" via dicta).
88 See Kahan & Kamar, supranote 1, at 1240.
89 Id. at 1240-41.
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support that claim. For example, they rightly point to the entire fairness standard as rather elastic, 90 yet they fail to articulate a complete
vision of what they would substitute. Would they ban all interested-

director transactions? Such a rule would be clear, to be sure, but
might also preclude socially beneficial transactions. Even they apparently do not believe that to be a wise option.
In lieu of this approach, Professors Kahan and Kamar suggest
that all interested-director transactions be put to a stockholder
vote 9 1 -a liability-insulating technique that is now optional for Delaware directors. 92 While I agree with them that Delaware law gives too
little (albeit still important) weight to stockholder ratification votes,
Professors Kahan and Kamar have failed to persuade me that it is
more efficient to mandate that directors use specific procedural safe93
guards in all interested transactions.
Under current Delaware law, directors are empowered to make
their own assessment of the advisability of using such safeguards on a
transaction-by-transaction basis.9 4 Directors know that subjecting an
interested-director transaction to the review and approval of a special
committee of independent directors, or of the disinterested stockholders, will profoundly affect their litigation risk. 95
Only when directors choose not to use one of these procedural
safeguards do they bear the burden of proving that the transaction
was fair.9 6 The proposition that directors who engage in a conflict
transaction should bear this burden seems to me uncontroversial.
And although the burden to demonstrate fairness may seem imprecise
as a matter of theory, as a matter of practice it is fairly straightforward:
the board must show that the transaction was consummated on as
97
favorable terms as could have been achieved in an arm's-length deal.
Although the relevance of process to this inquiry is sometimes murky,
Id. at 1236-37.
Although Professors Kahan and Kamar will not stamp their full approval on this
suggestion, their failure to embrace it unequivocally and their refusal to fully articulate an
alternative model of corporate law are indicative of the difficulty of improving on the Dela90
91

wvare Model. See id. at 1241 & n.148.
92 DEL. CODE ANN. title 8, § 144(a)(2) (1991).
93
If Professors Kahan and Kamar do not embrace the bright-line mandatory approach but simply enhanced "safe harbors," Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1241, they are
implicitly admitting the marginal nature of their concerns. Any close reader of Delaware
law can recognize that our courts already give a heavy weight to informed stockholder
votes. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 895-97 (Del. Ch. 1999);
Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1113 (Del. Ch. 1999); In re Gen. Motors Class H
S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 616 (Del. Ch. 1999).
94 See Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1113 (observing that shareholder ratification "can be employed as a powerful tool").
95 See id.
96 See id. at 1112-13, 1113 n.38.
97 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983).
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a limitation of the inquiry to "fair" value in the appraisal sense would
be bad public policy.9 8
I view the entire fairness standard as a workable one that reflects
the Delaware Model's fundamental emphasis on flexibility.9 9 Delaware law gives boards the option to structure conflict transactions in a
manner that limits litigation risk, but it does not require directors to
follow those procedures. 10 0 If, instead, boards decide to engage in
conflict transactions without procedural safeguards, Delaware law simply requires them to prove that they acted fairly. t0 1 Professors Kahan

and Kamar would replace the costs that flow from decisions individual
boards make themselves on a transaction-by-transaction basis with the
considerable costs that would flow from their own preference for a

stockholder vote in every interested-director transaction. 02 But they
do not attempt to assess whether their Mandatory Statutory Model
would be more beneficial in the aggregate than the Delaware Model.
Questions abound about their proposal. For example, will there be
an exception for transactions involving less than, say, a million dollars
because of the inefficiency of holding a vote in such circumstances? If
so, what standard of review will apply to such transactions?
Importantly, Professors Kahan and Kamar do not point to any
significant number of irrational results reached by Delaware courts in
98 A simple example suffices to show why it is necessary to examine process. Assume a
board sold a corporate asset at a fair price to an insider when a third-party had offered to
pay an even higher price. If the only focus of the fairness inquiry was on fair value in the
appraisal sense, an important element of fiduciary accountability would obviously be lost.
Why? Because the stockholders were entitled to have the corporate asset sold at te highest available price, not just at a fair price.
Thus, the process prong is best seen as one which ensures that self-interested fiduciaries get the best deal reasonably available for the corporation. Although arguably the deftnition of fair price in the entire fairness context already takes this into account, see Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("Cede II") (fair price is the "highest value" that was "reasonably available under the circumstances"), the larger point is that
justice necessarily requires that the court examine the process to determine whether the
directors obtained a truly fair price.
99 I agree with Professors Kahan and Kamar that this rule could be improved. Aside
from giving greater liability-insulating effect to disinterested stochdolder votes, there are
other concerns about the standard, particularly the recent tendency to entangle te standard with issues (e.g., lack of due care) that do not relate to the justifications for the
standard's existence. See, e.g., Cede 1, 634 A.2d at 350-51 (reversing trial court's approach
requiring the shareholder plaintiff to "prove injury resulting from a found board breach of

duty of care [in order] to rebut the businessjudgement presumption" and remanding uith
instructions to apply the entire fairness standard of review); Lyman Johnson, The Modest
BusinessJudgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAw . 625, 628-33 (2000) (criticizing the use of the entire
fairness standard to analyze breaches of the duty of care); Bud Roth, EntireFairnessReiew
for a "Pure"Breach of the Duty of Care Sensible Approad or Technicolor op?. 3 Da. L RE.
145, 145-46 (2000) (supporting a showing of causation and harm as an additional requirement to entire fairness review in the breach-of-duty-of-care context).
100 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
101 Weinberger,457 A.2d at 710.
102 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1. at 1240-41.
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Delaware

courts have not historically imposed unjustifiably painful judgments
on corporate defendants, corporations might well be reluctant to

trade in the current common-law regime, which affords them choices
in these matters, for an inflexible statutory one. Professors Kahan and

Kamar also fail to acknowledge the limitations of their preferred alternative in terms of its ability to foreclose all litigation. Unless they
would give ratification effect to uninformed stockholder votes, for example, their choice of a mandated plebiscite in all interested transactions might simply shift the focus of the litigation to the adequacy of
the directors' disclosures.
Kahan and Kamar's recommendation for addressing tender of-

fers presents many of the same trade-offs as their proposal for dealing
with interested-director transactions. As a litigation-limiting reform,
they recommend that every fully-financed, all-shares tender offer be
presented to the stockholders. 10 4 Putting to one side the absence of

political consensus favoring this idea within Delaware's corporate constituencies, 105 what empirical evidence convincingly demonstrates that
this idea will increase shareholder value over the Delaware Model,
which emphasizes fiduciary responsibility in managing the board's reaction to mergers and acquisitions proposals? Undoubtedly, philo-

sophical justification exists for this idea, involving as it does the
premise that stockholders own the enterprise and should have the
chance to sell it. But again this approach involves replacing a system
of director choice monitored by judicial oversight through litigation
with an unvarying statutory mandate. Put bluntly, while the Delaware
103
1 acknowledge their citation of Smith v. Van Gorkom. See id. at 1237 n.133. I also
agree that there are incremental improvements that would speed up the pace at which
merifless cases are resolved and thus result in a reduction of litigation costs. The Court of
Chancery's reaction to the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Emerald Partnersv. Berlin,
726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999), is indicative of that attitude.
Emerald Partnersheld that an exculpatory charter provision was "in the nature of an
affirmative defense," 726 A.2d at 1223, and arguably cast doubt on whether such provisions
could help directors obtain early dismissals of damage claims resting solely on allegations
sufficient to state a due care violation, but not a loyalty violation.
In a series of opinions, the Court of Chancery interpreted Emerald Partnersin a manner that was faithful to the case but that still enabled defendants to obtain dismissal of .a
complaint by relying on an exculpatory charter provision. See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo
Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 2000) (requiring defendants to show that complaint
did not state facts that would support a finding that the defendant's actions fell outside the
protection of the exculpatory charter provision); In re Frederick's of Hollywood, Inc.
S'holders Litig., C.A No. 15944, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at *19-*20 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
2000) (Jacobs, V.C.) (same); In re Lukens Inc. S'holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 728, 732-34
(Del. Ch. 1999) (same); Inre Gen. Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 619 n.7
(Del. Ch. 1999) (same).
104 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1241 & n.148.
105 This factor greatly limits the prospects for the adoption of this proposal. See supra
Part III.
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Model relies upon governmental involvement, that involvement is limited to a (usually deferential) inquiry into the propriety of choices
made in the first instance by the elected representatives of stockholders. Professors Kahan and Kamar would replace that element of director choice (whether or not to allow the presentation of an offer to the
stockholders) with an inflexible statutory obligation to do so. That
value judgment may or may not be correct, but Kahan and Kamar do
not even attempt to demonstrate that their Mandatory Statutory
Model would be more efficient.
Although Professors Kahan and Kamar imply that there are corporate-law systems more determinate and efficient than Delaware's,1 06
lacking in their exposition is a richer description of where those systems are and how they operate in practice. Have these systems actually been tested in the crucible of a steady stream of transactions?
What sort of checks do they provide on the potential for managerial
abuse? How do those checks work in practice, with what speed, and at
what cost? What values are sacrificed by being more "determinate"?
What does the empirical evidence (e.g., the market aluations of their
companies compared to comparable Delaware companies) suggest
about the relative utility of their approach over the Delaware
07
Model?
I recognize that Professors Kahan and Kamar only tentatively advance their contention that Delaware's corporate law is modestly inefficient.' 0 8 Nonetheless, the absence of a fully articulated example of
how their preferred system has operated in a superior manner is telling.' 0 9 Until such an example emerges, one might take a somewhat
more optimistic view of the Delaware Model. Namely, one might conclude that Delaware's corporation law is highly dynamic, quick to innovate on the basis of a constituency consensus, but modest and
incremental when the "right" answer is in doubt. Delaware corporate
law generally permits corporate managers wide flexibility and errs on
the side of managerial freedom. At the same time, it reserves to its
courts the power to intervene in a careful and case-specific way when
it appears, based on demonstrated facts, that managers have placed
their self-interest above their duty or have usurped or impaired the
authority left to the stockholders as owners. This reserved power of
limited judicial intervention is best seen as the necessary cost of ensuring that the broadly empowering-and thus ultimately more effiSee Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1239 n.144, 1242.
Cf DAINES, supranote 57, at 45 tbl.1, 46 tbl.2 (comparing the t)pical characteristics
of Delaware and non-Delaware firms).
108 See Kahan & Kamar, supranote 1, at 1233-35.
109 The recent increase in European mergers and acquisitions activity provides an opportunity for such descriptive exercises. S4 eg.,John Finley, LVAM's FailedBidfor Guci, 2
106
107

M & AJ. 8 (2000); John Finley, Telecom Italiaand Olivelti, 2 M & Aj. 4 (2000).
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cient-Delaware Model does not result in director abuses that would
shake the confidence of investors in the integrity of our system of corporate governance and discourage them from investing capital.
Finally, I cannot help but note that the cries of indeterminacy
from sophisticated corporate practitioners strike me as somewhat exaggerated." 0 The Delaware courts have articulated many norms to
guide practitioners."' For example, it is conventional wisdom that a
corporate board wishing to reduce its exposure to derivative suits
should consist of a majority of independent directors." 2 Similarly, in
the area of self-interested transactions, these norms clearly point a
corporate board having an interested majority toward using a welladvised special committee of disinterested directors to negotiate the
transaction, and toward requiring stockholder approval based on full
disclosure if the board wishes to avoid the burden of proving the
transaction's entire fairness." 3 Similar norms give boards guidance
about the propriety of certain defensive measures contained in
merger agreements, such as termination fees and no-shops." 4 These
norms allow for ex ante planning by practitioners and boards thereby
enabling them to minimize ex post litigation risks.
Accordingly, only when boards seek to "push the envelope" do
they become subject to significant risk of liability. For example, the
recent litigation involving "no talk" provisions in merger agreements
is indicative of corporate practitioners testing how strong deal protection measures can be made in a non-Revlon context.",5 Ditto the now
110
See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1234 n.120, 1237 n.136 (referring to criticism
of practitioners).

11

Rock, supranote 70, at 1016-17.

112 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (indicating that a determination of demand futility in a derivative suit requires the Court of Chancery to find that
"directors are disinterested and independent" and "the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment").
113 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115-18 (Del.
1994).
114 See, eg., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505-06 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citing
cases).
115 See, e.g., Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 104-09 (Del. Ch. 1999) (concern-

ing a no-talk provision that allowed the target board a "fiduciary out" only upon rcceiving
written advice from counsel that such action was "mandated" by their fiduciary duty in a
situation where the board's inability to exercise its fiduciary out would bind stockholders
holding 33.5% of the stock to vote for the original merger agreement even if a higher bid
was available); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., No. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 202, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (indicating that strict no-talk provisions interfere with board members' duty to inform themselves when deciding whether or not to
negotiate with third-party bidders); cf., e.g., IXC Communications, Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell,
Inc., No. 17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210, at *16-'17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (concerning
a no-talk provision which was subsequently retracted).
Although I acknowledge that there are important unresolved doctrinal tensions in
Delaware corporate law that are a source of legitimate concern to transactional lawyers,
such lawyers (as one should expect) themselves sometimes create or exploit these tensions
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moribund "slow hand" 1 6 and "dead hand" poison pills."17 In this environment, one should not, I think, overestimate the uncertainty created by Delaware law's failure to address such issues in the legislative
process.
During the last several years, a significant amount of mergers and
acquisitions activity involving Delaware corporations has taken place
without a corresponding wave of takeover litigation." 8 This fact
makes it at least worth pondering whether Delaware's norm-based approach has instead provided solid and workable guidance to practitioners structuring fundamental transactions. Litigated cases are the
ones that are most studied. What is less often studied is the far greater

number of transactions consummated without any serious or costly
litigation challenge. 1 19
I wish, however, to end on a less self-congratulatory note. Everyone who plays a role in shaping Delaware corporate law should carefully consider the thoughtful and well-articulated views of Professors
Kahan and Kamar. We risk much by arrogantly assuming that Delaware's dominance results from the fact that our corporate law is the
clearest and best administered. Instead, we must constantly examine
in the course of zealously representing their clients. Byway of example, some practitioners
have apparently adopted the view that so-called "deal protection measures" such as noshops, termination fees, and cross-options contained in stock-for-stock merger agreements
are not reviewable under the heightened scrutiny of Unotal Corp. v. Mesa Plro!eum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), unless the merger is a change of control implicating duties under
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Sre, e.g., Paul
K. Rowe, The Future of the "Friendly Deal" in Delaware 14-15 (July 10, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); cf, e-g. Pat Vlahakis, Fiduciary Duties and Riduciary Outs, 2
M & AJ. 13, 13, 15 (2000) (acknowledging that deal protection measures are subject to the
Unocal standard, but criticizing recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions for failing to
honor the target board's ability under Time to refuse to negotiate ith hostile third-party
bidders).
They base this view in part on the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramnount
Communications,Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Row.e, supra, at 1. To make
my point that practitioners sometimes get a bit edgy, I need only note that Time itself held
that the deal protection measures in the original Time-Warner merger agreement were
properly reviewed under Unocal even though the merger did not implicate Revlon. Time,
571 A.2d at 1151-55.
116 That is, the "Eric Clapton" pill. The cases sometimes refer to these as a "no hand"
or "delayed redemption" provisions. As a music fan, I prefer the term "slow hand."
117 Eg., Quickturn Design S)s., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1283, 1290-92 (Del.
1998) (invalidating slow-hand pill); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1189-95
(Del. Ch. 1998) (discussing invalidity of dead-hand pill provision).
118
See Bernard S. Black, The FirstInternationalMerger Wave (and the IJflh and Last U.S.
Wave), 54 U. MsiA L. REv. 799, 809 (2000); Joseph H. Flom, Arrgyr & Acquisitions: The
Decade in Review, 54 U. ILmii L REv. 753, 754"2 (2000).
119 Given the large amount of mergers and acquisition activity during the period from
1989 to 1998, see Flom, supra note 118, at 753-54, the fact that only fourteen to fifteen
percent of the largest Delaware corporations were involved in corporate litigation does not
seem to me to provide much support for the argument that the uncertainty of Delaware's
corporate law promotes litigation. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1228 tbl.2.
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whether that is true, and must identify and correct the ways in which
we fall short of the mark.
One way Delaware's judiciary can help in this process is to commit to grappling more openly and honestly with difficult questions of
corporate law. Sometimes, Delaware opinions gloss over challenging
policy disputes. Sometimes, decisions cut a new path while failing to
admit that the court is turning its back on existing precedent that
points in a different direction. Candid struggles with the hard issues
Delaware faces will expose what issues are ripe for legislative action,
and invite valued feedback from Delaware's varied corporate-law constituents.' 20 This mindset will enable Delaware to improve its law and
perhaps earn the ultimate accolade from law professors steeped in ec-

onomics: a paper concluding that Delaware law truly is efficient.

120

See Allen, supra note 72, at 901-02. As Chancellor Allen states,
Candor is the first among a list of essential virtues ofjudicial opinions in a
democracy. Candor is not, however, without social risks and costs. It can
expose uncertainty in choice and thus it may be thought a risk to judicial
legitimacy in a democracy. While the risks are real, their existence is not
conclusive. It is more important, in my opinion, that the citizens who willingly subject themselves to the rule of law understand what that process
really is; understand when and why choice is unavoidable; understand that
choices made have been made openly in an intellectually honest way and
that the judicial process, as a whole, is subject to democratic control. If a
case decision necessitates a difficult choice, that fact should be exposed and
all choices made should be justified with good reasons. It is neither honest,
nor I suppose intelligent, to attempt to hide choice when choice is cornpelled by circumstance. Ajudicial system that exposes its grounds-its real
grounds, which may extend beyond a set of doctrinal expressions-is in the
end, the better system of government.

